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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
"EXCEPTION" TO THE MIDDLE
EASTERN REFUGEE CRISIS: WHY
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
SHOULD INTERVENE AGAINST ISIS
Milena Sterio*
I. INTRODUCTION
The refugee crises in Iraq and Syria, which has been evolv-
ing over the past decade as a result of both ongoing conflict in
these countries and the recent surge of Islamic State-led vio-
lence, has morphed into a true humanitarian catastrophe., Tens
of thousands of refugees have been subjected to violence and
have been dispersed and forced to live under dire conditions;
such massive population flows have destabilized the entire re-
gion and have threatened the stability of neighboring countries.2
The United States and several other countries have been en-
gaged in a military air strike campaign against the Islamic State,
but the international community has otherwise not authorized a
multilateral military action against the Islamic State in order to
alleviate refugee and other humanitarian suffering.3 This Arti-
cle will argue that in light of such a tremendous humanitarian
crisis, reflected in the current refugee crisis, international law
authorizes states to intervene through the paradigm of humani-
tarian intervention. This Article will argue that if international
law embraces the concept of humanitarian intervention as an
evolving norm of customary law, then this norm encompasses
* The Charles R. Emrick Jr.- Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The
author would like to thank the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for its generous
research support, which has been invaluable for the research and writing of this Arti-
cle, as well as Elisabeth Leonard for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Iraqi & Syrian Refugee Crisis, WORLD HELP, http://worldhelp.net/iraqi-syrian-
refugee-relief/ (last visited May 30, 2015).
2. Id. "Millions of lives hang in the balance, lacking access to the most basic
necessities needed for survival. Food, water, shelter, and medical care are desperately
needed." Id.
3. See infra Part III.
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intervention in situations of a humanitarian refugee crisis, such
as the one that has unfolded in Iraq and Syria.
In Part II, this Article will provide background on the Is-
lamic State, and on its recent operations in Iraq and Syria. In
Part III, this Article will briefly describe the ongoing refugee
crises in Iraq and Syria, caused by Islamic State-led warfare in
the region. Part IV of this Article will focus on the use of force
under international law, and Part V will discuss the evolving
concept of humanitarian intervention. Part VI will propose a le-
gal framework for the evolving norm of humanitarian interven-
tion, including humanitarian intervention to assuage a severe
refugee crisis. This Article will conclude that international law
can, and should, develop in order to embrace a new normative
framework for humanitarian intervention, which can then apply
to situations of severe refugee crises causing humanitarian suf-
fering. States which are unable and unwilling to address human-
itarian catastrophes, including significant refugee crises, should
be subject to external intervention by other states acting to halt
such humanitarian suffering.
II. THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE AND ITS SUCCESSFUL
EXPANSION IN IRAQ AND SYRIA
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as
the Islamic State and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), started as an Al Qaeda splinter group in Iraq in 2004.4
The group, first known as Islamic State in Iraq, attempted to
merge with the al-Nusra Front in Syria in 2013, to form the so-
called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.5 Although the al-
Nusra leadership rejected the merger with Islamic State in Iraq,
by 2014, Islamic State in Iraq had overtaken large swaths of ter-
ritory in both Iraq and Syria and announced the creation of a
caliphate that would efface all state borders, turning Islamic
State's leaders into the self-declared authority over the world's
estimated 1.5 billion Muslims. 6 In 2014, the group also an-
4. ISIS Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-
facts/ (last updated May 23, 2015).
5. Id.
6. Id. See also KENNETH KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43612,
THE "ISLAMIC STATE" CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY 1 (Feb. 11, 2015), available at https://
www.scribd.com/fullscreen/257029095?access-key=key-rqLsl lS7vMJnfAdvVrH8&al
lowshare=true&escape=false&viewmode=scroll [hereinafter CRS Report] (describ-
ing ISIS leaders' vision of creating caliphate in Middle East).
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nounced a name change to the Islamic State (IS).7 Its fighters
are mostly comprised of former Iraqi soldiers, who are unable to
serve under the new Iraq government after Saddam Hussein's
military was disbanded. By 2014, the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) had announced that ISIS fighters totaled some-
where between 20,000 and 31,500 - an estimate far greater than
many analysts had originally predicted.8 Its aim is to establish
an Islamic state or caliphate in the Sunni areas of the Middle
East, which encompasses large parts of both Syria and Iraq.
ISIS currently controls hundreds of square miles; it has a pres-
ence from Syria's Mediterranean coast to south of Baghdad.
ISIS funds itself through oil production and smuggling as well as
through ransoms from kidnappings, selling stolen artifacts, ex-
tortion and controlling crops. ISIS "is a transnational Sunni Is-
lamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its
control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria
since 2013, threatening the security of both countries and draw-
ing increased attention from the international community."9
ISIS rules by Sharia law. It is known for killings thousands
of people, carrying out public executions and punishing all those
perceived as disrespecting Sharia law.' 0 In addition, ISIS fight-
ers have destroyed numerous valuable antiquities in the area."
Moreover, ISIS fighters have driven tens of thousands of Syrians
and Iraqis out of their homes, thereby causing a tremendous ref-
ugee crisis in the Middle East.12 By December of 2014, the
United Nations reported that an estimated 3 million refugees in
the area were in need of humanitarian assistance.13
One of the reasons that ISIS has been able to operate with
such success in areas of Iraq and Syria, and has been able to
cause the displacement of as many individuals, is because of the
already volatile situations in both of these countries. Both Iraq
and Syria have experienced ongoing internal conflict over the
7. ISIS Fast Facts, supra note 4.
8. CRS Report, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Id.
10. ISIS Fast Facts, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part III.
13. WORLD HELP, supra note 1.
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past decade - Iraq since 2003 and Syria since the Arab Spring.14
Both of these countries have a history of instability and internal
unrest and were fertile ground for the rise of the ISIS terrorist
organization. The section below will briefly describe the current
refugee situations in Iraq and Syria as massive flows of refugees
have overwhelmed the Middle East and provoked a true hu-
manitarian catastrophe. This Article will analyze whether third
states have the right to militarily intervene in places, such as
Iraq and Syria, in order to appease humanitarian suffering in-
herent in a refugee crisis.
III. ISIS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THE ONGOING
REFUGEE CRISIS
"The humanitarian situations in Iraq and Syria have been
described as a 'mega crisis' in part because displacements and
movement of populations are intertwined between the two
countries."'5 Estimates indicate that "17.4 million people living
in either Iraq or Syria are affected by conflict and in need of
humanitarian assistance.1 6 In addition, more than 3.3 million
Syrians and nearly 0.2 million Iraqis are displaced as refugees."' 7
Iraq has experienced an urgent humanitarian crisis, with an
estimated 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian and pro-
tection assistance since January 2014. In addition, reports indi-
cate that over 2.1 million people in Iraq are Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs), that 1.5 million are in areas under the control of
armed groups, such as ISIS, or impacted by the conflict, and that
0.2 million are Syrian refugees.' 8 Close to half of the newly dis-
placed persons are believed to be children. 19 "As of late Octo-
ber 2014, of the 2.1 million IDPs, an estimated 850,000 were
seeking shelter in Iraq's Kurdistan region, mainly in Dohuk
governorate, while increased movements to central and south-
14. See Joseph O'Rourke, Education for Syrian Refugees: The Failure of Second-
Generation Human Rights During Extraordinary Crises, 78 ALB. L. REV. 711, 713-717
(2014-15) (detailing Syrian civil war).
15. CRS Report, supra note 6, at 22 (citing United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Antonio Guterres). "Faced with 'mega-crisis,' U.N. warns of refugee
suffering and security threats." Id. at 23 n.79.
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id.
18. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Iraq Crisis, Situa-
tion Report No. 22 (November 22-28, 2014) [hereinafter Situation Report].
19. Id.
2015] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION "EXCEPTION" 329
ern Iraq were straining the response capacities of host communi-
ties in these areas." 20 In addition to IDPs in Kurdistan, it is
estimated that over 700,000 persons are displaced in the central
region and 200,000 in the south.21
The conflict situation in Iraq, coupled with the rise in secta-
rian violence, has exacerbated the refugee crisis. "An estimated
3.6 million Iraqis reside in areas under the control of the IS and
other armed groups. Of these, 2.2 million are thought to be
trapped in conflict-affected areas." 22 These IDPs, living in con-
flict areas, lack access to basic health services as well as food,
water, and other supplies, and are considered to be in urgent
need of humanitarian assistance.23
The ongoing conflict in Syria has equally created a serious
humanitarian crisis.24 As of November 2014, more than half of
the population in Syria was in need of humanitarian assistance
(12.2 million people).25 According to the same reports, 7.6 mil-
lion Syrians have been displaced inside the country. "In addi-
tion, more than 3.3 million Syrians are displaced as refugees,
with 97% fleeing to countries in the immediate surrounding re-
gion, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other
parts of North Africa." 26 According to a troubling United Na-
tions statistic, in 2014, an average of more than 90,000 Syrians
per month have been registering as refugees in countries in the
region.27 This number continues to increase as the political and
military situation worsens; humanitarian needs of all such refu-
gees are tremendous and increase daily. In addition to regis-
tered and registering refugees, many Syrians are estimated to be
living in remote areas that have been besieged by either the
20. CRS Report, supra note 6, at 23.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Situation Report, supra note 18.
24. See Paul R. Williams et al., Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: Execu-
tive Power and International Crises: Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsi-
bility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 473, 489 (2012)
(concluding Syria crisis rivals "worst humanitarian tragedies of the past two
decades").
25. U.N. Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Re-
lief Coordinator, Security Council Briefing on Syria (November 25, 2014), available at
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG`%20Valerie%20Amos%20SecCo
%20statement%20on%20Syria%2025%20November%202014%20as%20delivered
.pdf.
26. KATZMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 24.
27. Id.
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Government of Syria or various opposition forces at different
points in the conflict.28 In areas under siege by the Syrian gov-
ernment, reports have surfaced about intentional policies of
starvation, attacks against civilians and indiscriminant use of
heavy weapons, as well as "a weak health infrastructure that is
often under deliberate attack" by government forces.29 It thus
appears that many Syrian civilians are living under dire condi-
tions and are in obvious need of humanitarian assistance. Last
but not least, some Syrians appear to be living as de facto
refugees.
Experts recognize that some Syrians have not registered as refugees,
presumably from fear or other reasons, and have chosen instead to
blend in with the local population, living in rented accommodations
and makeshift shelters, particularly in towns and cities. The U.N. Of-
fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) esti-
mates that more than 80% of Syrian refugees are living outside camps
in mostly urban settings. 30
The Syrian refugee crisis has negatively impacted neighbor-
ing countries, including Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, whose
governments have expressed concerns about the potential politi-
cal implications of allowing thousands of IDPs to remain for a
protracted period of time.31 In addition, the presence of such
large refugee populations in these host countries has drained
such countries' economies, energy, and natural resources and
has the potential to destabilize the entire region.32 Under such
dire circumstances, when the refugee crisis of one or more
states, caused by ongoing conflict, has heavily impacted neigh-
boring states and has the potential to destabilize the entire re-
gion, can third states intervene militarily to appease the refugee
crisis under the guise of humanitarian intervention? In other
words, can a refugee crisis ever justify a military humanitarian
intervention staged outside of the parameters of United Na-
tions-sanctioned measures and operations? The section below
will analyze the most important international law principles on
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Mike Sanderson, The Syrian Crisis and the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
89 INT'L L. STUD. 776, 778 (2013) (noting majority of Syrian refugee remain in five
countries surrounding Syria: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; concluding
that because refugee presence has had high impact on these countries, "it would be
naive to expect such generosity to persist indefinitely").
32. See KATZMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 24.
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the use force, as well as the evolving humanitarian intervention
exception, in order to attempt to answer this difficult question.
IV. USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law generally prohibits all states from using
force against each other, except in situations of self-defense or
pursuant to the United Nations Security Council authorization.
This Article will discuss in this Part the general ban on the use of
force (A), the two exceptions to this ban (B), and recent exam-
ples of states' use of force (C).
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force
According to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state." 33 This general ban on the use of
force is a fundamental norm of international treaty law, as evi-
denced by the United Nations Charter, as well as part of cus-
tomary law with the character of jus cogens norms, as confirmed
by the International Court of Justice.34 Under the Charter rules,
nations agreed to not use force against each other, in exchange
for a vision of the world wherein states would enjoy their terri-
tory and their freedom to be let alone by external actors.
State sovereignty in its traditional form implied that each
state was autonomous - that a state had to voluntarily consent
to any outside authority.35 The general ban on the use force, de-
scribed above, flows from this traditional notion of state sover-
eignty. In other words, sovereignty has historically implied that
states were free to engage in any type of behavior that they saw
fit within their own borders, and that no other states were al-
lowed to intervene in order to stop that behavior, no matter how
repugnant it may have been. Sovereignty thus served a specific
purpose: that of a shield, protecting states from outside intrusion
and use of force by other states or groups of states.36
33. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
34. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 190 (June 27).
35. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-11 (1995).
36. See GARETH EVANS, ET. AL., INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INT'L COMM. ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001), available at http://responsibilityto
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In addition, the traditional notion of sovereignty also im-
plied that only states were relevant actors in international law;
only states could be subject to international norms and treaties
and any prohibition on different types of behavior could only
extend to states.37 Thus, if a state chose to abuse its own popula-
tion, or if a non-state actor, such as ISIS today, engaged in par-
ticularly reprehensible behavior, this was not a problem of
international law, as private individuals and non-state actors did
not constitute subjects of international law. In other words, the
concept of state sovereignty dictated that international law
should not intervene in matters occurring solely within state
borders, when such matters did not concern other states. This
idea is rooted in another fundamental concept of international
law, the principle of non-intervention. "[I]nternational law . . .
plac[es] a duty on all sovereign states not, broadly speaking, to
intervene in the internal affairs of others . . . [A] state has the
international legal right, the sovereign right, to conduct itself
throughout its territory as, by and large, it sees fit."38 The princi-
ple of non-intervention flows directly from the concept of state
sovereignty and dictates that states have the right to be free of
outside interference.
Finally, the idea of state sovereignty is reflected in another
doctrine of international law- the principle of uti possidetis. Ac-
cording to uti possidetis, "states emerging from decolonization
shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders
that they held at the time of independence."39 Uti possidetis
thus protects existing colonial borders from change, by elevating
them to the status of international borders. The principle of uti
possidetis has a direct link to the notion of state sovereignty: a
state, once in existence and delineated by its borders, may not
be interfered with by any actors in the international arena. Uti
possidetis is a general principle of international law, as con-
protect.org/ICISS%2OReport.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report]. The Report of the In-
ternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty correctly points out
that sovereignty traditionally functioned as control.
37. Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 213, 216 (2008).
38. Alan James, The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited 336, in KosoVO AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION §21 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh
Thakur eds., 2000).
39. Steven Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New
States, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 590, 592-93 (1996).
[Vol. 38:2
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firmed by the International Court of Justice, which has held that
this principle's "obvious purpose is to prevent the independence
and stability of new States." 4 0 In addition, the principle of uti
possidetis has been applied in other non-colonial contexts, to
protect intra-state borders from subsequent change within civil
conflicts, such as the one in the former Yugoslavia.41 While the
idea of preserving the status quo and thereby preventing further
territorial squabbles is generally appealing to many, the devel-
opment and application of uti possidetis has led, somewhat un-
fortunately, to the international community's reluctance to
intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, even when
such intervention may save thousands of civilian lives.
"[T]he extension of uti possidetis to modern breakups leads
to genuine injustices and instability by leaving significant popu-
lations both unsatisfied with their status in new states and uncer-
tain of political participation there. . ."42 Thus, the principle of
uti possidetis may lead to unfortunate stalemates within the in-
ternational community in instances of civil/internal warfare.
The application of uti possidetis may indefinitely protect state
borders by prohibiting forceful border changes; the application
of the non-intervention principle may further protect states, as
delineated by their international borders, from any future en-
croachment by external actors. Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter and its general ban on the use of force reflects this
type of logic and encompasses the three principles of sover-
eignty, uti possidetis, and non-intervention.
40. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 1.C.J. 554, 1 20 (Dec. 22). The
International Court of Justice has also discussed and affirmed the principle of uti pos-
sidetis. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.; Nicar. Interven-
ing), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 345 (Sept. 11) (stating "this is a principle the application of which
is automatic: on independence, the boundaries of the relevant colonial administrative
divisions are transformed into international frontiers").
41. Documents Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia Conference on
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the Disso-
lution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11 & July 3, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1499 (1992). But see,
Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (1993) (criti-
cizing approach and arguing Commission's "neo-decolonization territorial approach
can have troubling consequences if used to legitimize secession for groups possessing
a distinct political status while denying the right of secession to territorially based
ethnic communities not formally organize into political units").
42. Ratner, supra note 39, at 590-91.
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B. Exceptions to the Prohibition
The Charter contemplates two exceptions to the above-
mentioned prohibition on the use of force. First, the United Na-
tions Charter contemplates the right of self-defense for each
member state. Under Article 51, every state has the right to ex-
ercise self-defense if it has been the target of an armed attack by
another state or group of states.4 3 The Charter's notion of self-
defense is consistent with the above-described notion of state
sovereignty. State sovereignty implies that states should be free
of external interference; if a state attacks another state, how-
ever, the so-called sovereignty shield has been broken by the
aggressor state, and the victim state should be entitled to act
against the aggressor state. It may also be argued that a state
which uses military force against another state in self-defense
does not act in contravention of Article 2(4), because such de-
fensive actions are not committed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of the attacker state, but are instead
exercised because of self-protection and self-defense. Self-de-
fense exists on both the individual level, where the attacked or
threatened state acts against the attacker, and the collective
level, where a group of attacked or threatened states acts against
the attacker. 4 4
The Second exception to the Charter's general ban on the
use of force allows for the possibility of collective military action
against a rogue state, pursuant to the explicit authorization of
the Security Council.45 The United Nations Charter's structure
reflects the post-World War II international balance of power: in
the wake of the Great War, victor countries created this world
organization, in an effort to preserve international peace and se-
curity. While each state is considered equal and sovereign as a
member of the United Nations organization and can vote in its
General Assembly, World War II victor countries maintained
their superior status and political, military and economic advan-
43. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 51.
44. See Ratner, supra note 39 (discussing various types of self-defense).
45. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security").
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tage through the creation of the Security Council, where five
permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France,
the Soviet Union/Russia, and China) hold veto power and can
authorize the use of military force against any other state. 46
These five powerful states, through the creation of the Security
Council and its veto structure preserved the right to unilaterally
decide whether member state sovereignty could be breached in
the future, by holding onto to the power to authorize the use of
force against others.
Throughout the Cold War, the Security Council remained
paralyzed, because of politically conflicting positions of the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Council authorized the
use of force only two times: in Korea in 1950, and in Iraq in 1990
(the First Gulf War).47 The Security Council has been more ac-
tive since the end of the Cold War, and it has authorized the use
of military force for various purposes, such as peacekeeping op-
erations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Kosovo and East Timor, and by regional
arrangements, such as the ECOWAS Mission in C6te d'Ivoire
(ECOMICI), the European Union force in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (EUFOR R.D. Congo) and the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).48 Moreover, the Coun-
cil has authorized the use of force more broadly, by "all neces-
sary means" or "all necessary measures," in Somalia, Haiti,
46. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 35, at 137-38 (noting states involved in negotia-
tion of the UN Charter sought to outlaw war and that this was their main objective);
see generally OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
1945, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un (last visited June 1, 2015). As
of today, it is unlikely that the five permanent members of the Security Council would
accept to change the existing veto structure. As a recent meeting in March 2013,
representatives of the five permanent members declared the following:
Many of reform proposals include a demand on elimination of veto
power of the permanent members or include a proposal to provide
veto powers to new permanent members. We would like to declare
that our delegations will not compromise to any of proposals which
would change the current veto structure.
Luka Kavib, The Security Council Big Five: 'Current Veto Structure Will Not change',
THE UN HERALD (Mar. 21, 2013), http://unherald.blogspot.com/2013/04/the-security-
council-big-five-are-clear.htmi.
47. See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, 14. WHAT KIND OF MEASURES INVOLVING THE
USE OF ARMED FORCE HAS THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSED IN THE PAST?, FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONs, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/faq.shtml#measures (last
visited June 1, 2015).
48. Id.
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Rwanda, Eastern Zaire, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East
Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and
Iraq.4 9 Most recently, the Council has authorized Member
States, acting nationally or regionally, to use force in Libya, in
order to protect civilians who were under threat of attack be-
cause of this country's unfolding civil unrest.5 0 Despite the in-
creased number of more recent authorizations for the use of
force by the Security Council, it can be observed that most such
instances of approval for the use of force have entailed either
limited mandates for the use of force (to protect civilians in
Libya or for specific peacekeeping operations in the former Yu-
goslavia, Somalia, East Timor, etc.), or missions organized by
regional organizations, such as in the case of ECOWAS, the Eu-
ropean Union or the African Union. General approvals by the
Security Council for the use of force by "all necessary means"
against a United Nations Member State have remained limited
throughout this organization's history. When the United Na-
tions Charter was negotiated, in the wake of World War II,
states agreed not to use force in the future, because they hoped
that international peace and security would be preserved if all
states respected this system. Under the Charter, the use of
force, even if authorized by the Security Council, remains a lim-
ited and rare occurrence, as this organization's drafters had
hoped and predicted.
C. States' Use of Force Throughout Charter History
United Nations' Member States have occasionally used
force against each other, despite the Charter's general prohibi-
tion, and outside of its two exceptions described above. Two
such instances of use of force by states include intervention by
states to protect their own nationals, as well as intervention to
support democracy and socialist regimes.
The British government asserted the protection of nationals
rationale for the use of force, when it intervened in Egypt dur-
ing the 1956 Suez Canal crisis; moreover, the same reasoning
was advanced by the United States when it invaded Grenada in
1983 and Panama in 1989.51 In addition, states have used a simi-
49. Id.
50. See generally S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973/2011 (Mar. 17, 2011).
51. LOa F. DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
973-74 (4th ed. 2001).
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lar rationale to support the use force against other states, by ar-
guing that armed intervention to protect one's nationals and
rescue them from being held hostage is lawful.52 Israel used this
rationale to justify its intervention in Uganda, to rescue Israeli
hostages from a hijacked plane at Entebbe, and the United
States relied upon this logic when it intervened in Iran to rescue
American hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Teheran.53 It
should be noted that some have argued that state intervention
to protect its nationals is an instance of self-defense, which was
lawful under customary law before the promulgation of the
Charter, and which has remained lawful under the Charter. 54
Under this view, intervention to protect nationals would be an
authorized use of force by states but would instead fall squarely
within the confines of the Charter system. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to assess the validity of this argument; instead,
this Article will simply note that the protection and/or rescue of
nationals has constituted one of the grounds on which states
have sought to justify intervention within the borders of another
state.
Additionally, during the Cold War states have argued that
intervention to support democracy or intervention to support
other socialist regimes is a lawful exception to the general ban
on the use force under the Charter system. The United States,
under President Reagan, famously articulated the so-called Rea-
gan Doctrine: the notion that the United States has the right to
use military force on the territory of other states in order to de-
fend democracy and support democratic regimes55 In a parallel
move, Soviet Union leader, Leonyd Brezhnev, asserted a similar
right of socialist states to intervene in the territory of other
states to support the maintenance of socialist regimess6
52. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 41-42 (2d ed. 1991).
53. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 51, at 975.
54. D.W. BOWET, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-90 (1958); see
also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 51, at 973. But see IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 301 (1963) (arguing against legality
of use of force through intervention to protect nationals).
55. W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-
Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 34 n.13 (Damrosch & Scheffer eds., 1991).
56. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 51, at 977 (Brezhnev Doctrine manifested
itself in 1968, through Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia).
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Both of the above-mentioned exceptions to the prohibition
of the use of force have failed to garner significant support.
While military intervention to protect nationals may justify a
limited use of force, this type of rationale would not suffice as
legal ground for a large-scale humanitarian intervention. More-
over, both the Regan and the Brezhnev doctrines were specifi-
cally rejected by the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case, which held that "[t]he Court cannot contem-
plate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of interven-
tion by one State against another on the ground that the latter
has opted for some particular ideology or political system."57 In
sum, while some states have periodically referred to these legal
rationales to justify their use of force against other states, these
sporadic types of arguments have done little to change the ex-
isting treaty and customary law and their overall ban on the use
of force.
Throughout the United Nations' history, most states have
attempted to justify their respective uses of force against other
states by advancing legal arguments consistent with the organi-
zation's Charter. In most cases states have relied on the self-
defense exception to support their use of force. For example, the
former Soviet Union claimed that its military intervention in Af-
ghanistan in 1979 was justified because of self-defense.58 Russia,
its successor state, similarly used the self-defense argument to
justify its use of force in the Georgian break-away provinces,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in 2008. The United States as-
serted the self-defense rationale numerous times in the 1980's,
in order to support military incursions in Panama, Grenada, Ha-
iti, and Nicaragua. 59 It should be noted that the United States
has claimed a right of both anticipatory or preventive self-de-
57. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, [ 133 (June 27).
58. See Russian Invasion of Afghanistan, HISTORY LEARNING SITE, http://www
.historylearningsite.co.uk/russiainvasion_afghanistan.htm (last visited June 3, 2015).
The Soviet Union claimed that it had been invited by the then Afghan Prime Minister
Amin to help him stabilize his government in its fight against Islamic insurgency
throughout the country, the Soviet claim was essentially one of collective self-defense.
Id.
59. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 51, at 937 (noting U.S. representatives in
1980's, during military incursions into Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama, continued to
rely on validity of U.N. Charter and sought to justify American actions under law).
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fense,60 as well as preemptive self-defense. 61 Both types of self-
defense reflect instances where the state using force (United
States) attempted to justify its use of force by stretching the pa-
rameters of the self-defense argument to more nuanced situa-
tions which would not easily fall in the traditional self-defense
paradigm. This type of legal reasoning is consistent with the ar-
gument asserted above - that states using force under the United
Nations' Charter system most often attempt to advance legal ar-
guments consistent with the Charter itself, as opposed to at-
tempting to circumvent the system altogether.
In addition to the Great Powers, like the United States and
the former Soviet Union/Russia, other smaller states have relied
on the self-defense rationale to justify their use of military force
against other states. For example, Azerbaijan and Armenia
have claimed that they were exercising the right to self-defense
against each other throughout their military actions over the dis-
puted Nagorno-Karabakh region;62 Serbia has claimed self-de-
60. Id. at 966-67 (describing circumstances giving rise to 1989 military action
against Panama, which were, according to then President George H.W. Bush, exer-
cised in self-defense). See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1633-35 (1984) (providing general discussion of anticipatory
self-defense).
61. The Bush Doctrine was developed in the National Security Strategy of the
United States, published on September 17, 2002. This strategy document stated the
following:
The security environment confronting the United States today is radi-
cally different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of
the United States Government remains what it always has been: to
protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring
American principle that this duty obligates the government to antici-
pate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before
the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is
the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking an-
ticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy's attack. There are few greater threats
than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The
United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging
threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no
country should ever us preemption as a pretext for aggression.
The White House President George W. Bush, The White House, National Security
Strategy, Sep. 17, 2002, available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/
nss/2006/print/sectionV.html (2006).
62. See International Crisis Group, Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks,
Europe Briefing No. 71, 26 Sep. 2013, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/
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fense in its actions against Kosovo; 6 3 Israel has claimed self-
defense in its wars with Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. 64 This Arti-
cle will not attempt to discuss the specific validity of each of the
above-mentioned asserted self-defense claims, nor will this Arti-
cle evaluate the legal soundness of preventive or preemptive
self-defense. Instead, this Article will argue that while many
states may at times assert that the current norms on the use of
force, as they exist within the United Nations structure and in
customary law, are outdated or inflexible, most states consist-
ently advance legal arguments consistent with such norms, any
time they use force against other states.
It is also interesting to note that at times states have chosen
not to legally justify their military actions within the existing
United Nations legal structure, but that in such instances, states
have offered non-legal rationales to support their behavior, or
have claimed that their actions were necessary because of an ex-
traordinary situation. First, in some instances, states have ad-
vanced non-legal arguments to support their use of force. For
example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member
states asserted a moral, humanitarian rationale to justify air
strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.65
Most NATO countries having participated in the airstrikes chose
not to use legal arguments to justify their use of force against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and instead adopted a non-
legal rhetoric. 66 This type of rationale was also reflected in the
Files/europe/caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.pdf for a de-
tailed briefing of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict.
63. See generally Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration of Independence:
"Botching The Balkans" or Respecting International Law, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP L.
267 (2009) (providing detailed discussion of Kosovo).
64. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 173-79 (1996) (detailing Israeli wars with Egypt, Leb-
anon, and Syria involving claims of self-defense).
65. INDEPENDENT INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, IN-
TERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 167-68 (2000) [hereinafter Kosovo
COMMISSION].
66. For example, a few days before the start of the NATO-led aerial strikes
against the former Yugoslavia in 1999, the U. S. State Department spokesman stated
that, "[w]e and our NATO allies have looked to numerous factors in concluding that
such action, if necessary, would be justified. . .." and that "we and our NATO allies
believe there are legitimate grounds to threaten and, if necessary, use military force."
Sean Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 93 AM. J.INT'L. L. 628, 631 (1999). But see the position of the United Kingdom
government: "We are in doubt that NATO is acting within international law and our
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opinion of the independent international commission on Ko-
sovo, chaired by Richard Goldstone and Carl Tham, which pub-
lished a post-intervention analysis on the legality of the NATO
air strikes in Kosovo. The Goldstone and Tham analysis noted
that this type of humanitarian intervention "is a situation in a
gray zone of ambiguity between an extension of international
law and a proposal for an international moral consensus." 67
Moreover, according to Goldstone and Tham the use of force
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was illegal but legiti-
mate, because "a 'right' of humanitarian intervention is not con-
sistent with the UN Charter if conceived as a legal text, but
False it may, depending on context, nevertheless, reflect the
spirit of the Charter as it relates to the overall protection of peo-
ple against gross abuse." 68 Second, some states have at times
advanced a sui generis type of rhetoric to justify the use of force
against specific rogue regimes. For example, the United States
used an "exceptionalism" rhetoric during the NATO air strikes
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: then Secretary of
State, Condoleeza Rice, consistently referred to Kosovo as sui
generis - a case of use of force which does not create a prece-
dent, because of Kosovo's unique circumstances.69 According to
Rice, these unique circumstances, warranting the use of force
against the Yugoslav leadership, included the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo had been a province, and
the extraordinary force used by the Milosevic regime against
Kosovar Albanians.70 Similarly, United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral, Ban Ki-Moon, has labeled Kosovo as a "highly distinctive
legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe." Simon Duke et al., The Major
European Allies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in Kosovo AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION § 9 (Schnabel & Thakur eds., 2000)
[hereinafter KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE].
67. Id. at 164, 331-32.
68. Kosovo COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 186.
69. Id. at 174 ("NATO and its supporters have wisely avoided staking out any
doctrinal claims for its action either prior to or after the war. Rather than defining
the Kosovo intervention as a precedent, most NATO supporters among international
jurists presented the intervention as an unfortunate but necessary and reasonable
exception").
70. U.S. Rules out Recognising S. Ossetia, CIVIL.GE DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Mar.
6, 2008), http://www.civil.ge/englarticle.php?id=17273.
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situation" because of the international community's prolonged
involvement in this volatile region.71
This Article will not attempt to assess the validity of this
type of sui generis claim. Instead, this Article will argue that
states, including the most powerful ones, consistently attempt to
justify specific instances of use of force by referring to the ex-
isting United Nations' Charter-based framework on the use of
force. If such an argument cannot be worked out, states most
often resort to claiming that a particular instance of use for force
was exceptional or sui generis. Most states presumably engage
in this type of legal reasoning because they are uncomfortable
with the idea that any other state could attempt to use force
outside the confines of the United Nations system. Most states
presumably also believe that any use of force should remain ex-
ceptional and rare, which is why the more novel legal rationales
justifying the use of force to prevent humanitarian catastrophes
have met resistance. While most states likely agree that human-
itarian suffering should be stopped, they are often unwilling to
agree about the legality of the use of force outside of the con-
fines of the existing United Nations system. The following sec-
tion will discuss the evolving theory of humanitarian
intervention, as well as more novel developments such as the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine and the theory of involuntary
sovereignty waiver.
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION "EXCEPTION:" ITS
PROPOSED VALIDITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Humanitarian intervention has emerged as an external limi-
tation on state behavior during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury (A). It is linked to two other theories, Responsibility to
Protect (B) and involuntary sovereignty waiver (C), both of
which contemplate instances where external actors may be justi-
fied in intervening against a rogue regime which has been abus-
ing its own population, including in instances where the abuse
has sparked a severe refugee crisis.
71. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: I wish to note that Kosovo is a highly
distinctive situation, INTERFAX, http://web.archive.org/web20080314204124/http://
www.interfax.com/17/373003/Interview.aspx (last visited June 3, 2015).
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A. Origins of Humanitarian Intervention
The concept of humanitarian intervention has been de-
scribed as a vertical constraint on states, because external norms
are imposed on otherwise sovereign states "by diplomatic and
public persuasion, coercion, shaming, economic sanctions, isola-
tion, and in more egregious cases, by humanitarian interven-
tion."72 This phenomenon is revolutionary because "it
contradicts the notion of national sovereignty - that is, that a
state can do as it pleases in its own jurisdiction."73
The concept of humanitarian intervention developed over
the last century, international law evolved from a set of rules
governing inter-state behavior, to a complex labyrinth of rules,
regulations, codes, and directives applicable to both state and
non-state actors. 7 4 The fields of human rights law and humanita-
rian law evolved, imposing novel prohibitions on state actors
and limiting their otherwise un-checkered sovereignty.75 The
use of force for humanitarian purposes, which emerged over the
past few decades, represents situations where external states
have determined that intervening in the affairs of another sover-
eign state is crucial in order to protect individual rights and pre-
vent individual suffering. This type of use of force rationale
implies that the protection of the individual is important enough
in order to justify a breach of state sovereignty. In other words,
the intervening state will encroach upon the sovereignty of the
state which has been abusing human rights by launching a hu-
manitarian intervention against the latter.
This type of use of force toward humanitarian purposes
does not coincide with the above-described exceptions to the
overall ban on the use of force- self-defense and Security Coun-
cil authorization. In most instances of humanitarian interven-
tion, the intervening state does not act in self-defense, nor does
the Security Council become involved, typically because of a
permanent member veto. 76 In these situations, where the inter-
72. John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L.
907, 941 (2006).
73. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 6-7 (1983).
74. See Sterio, supra note 37, at 214.
75. Id. at 226-32 (discussing changes in international human rights law through
the creation of new norms and the development of limitations on state sovereignty).
76. See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A
FRESH LEGAL APPROACH BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN INTER-
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vening nation cannot assert a self-defense rationale and the Se-
curity Council experiences political paralysis disabling it from
authorizing the use of force, the intervening nation or group of
nations may argue that its actions are justified under the emerg-
ing norm of humanitarian intervention.77 Recent examples of
humanitarian intervention include the 1991 United Nations-au-
thorized intervention in north Iraq in order to protect the Kurds
and the 1999 NATO-led air strikes against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, described above. Other more remote instances
of humanitarian intervention include military action by India in
East Pakistan to "liberate" Bangladesh, and intervention by
Tanzania in Uganda, in order to oust dictator, Idi Amin.78
Much discussion about the legality of the emerging humani-
tarian intervention exception to the general ban on the use of
force was recently sparked in the context of the 1999 air strikes
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, briefly discussed
above. In 1999, NATO countries launched a series of air strikes
against Yugoslav leadership in order to halt government vio-
lence perpetrated against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.79 The
NATO campaign took place outside of the confines of the Char-
ter-sanctioned use of force structure, because the Security
Council was paralyzed in light of Russian and Chinese opposi-
tion to any authorization to use force against Yugoslavia.80 The
NATO-led campaign, which has been described as an instance of
humanitarian intervention,81 provoked significant legal contro-
versy. NATO member states advanced a humanitarian rationale
to justify their military intervention in Yugoslavia, by arguing
that the conflict was fought "to avert a humanitarian catastro-
NATIONAL LAW AND WORLD RELIGIONs 362 (2002) (noting Security Council vetoes
have blocked humanitarian interventions in the past).
77. See Nathan J. Miller, International Civil Disobedience: Unauthorized Inter-
vention and the Conscience of the International Community, 74 MD. L. REV. 315, 344
(2015) (describing that many scholars have argued in favor of the existence of a new
rule of customary international law superseding the prohibition on the use of force
found in the United Nations Charter).
78. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/ [hereinafter Koh Part II].
79. Williams et al., supra note 24, at 478.
80. Id. at 477-78.
81. Miller, supra note 77, at 345 (noting that the NATO intervention in Kosovo is
cited by proponents of the argument that international law permits this type of inter-
vention on humanitarian grounds).
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phe by disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried out
by the Yugoslav security forces against the Kosovo Albanians
and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in the fu-
ture." 82 Some scholars supported the intervention and argued
that humanitarian action can be justified "where a government
or effective authority actively exterminates its populace, or
where it denies to it that which is necessary for its survival, or
where it forcibly displaces it."83 Others were more critical and
argued that the NATO intervention was illegal under the ex-
isting Charter system, because of the inherent danger of adopt-
ing a humanitarian rationale to authorize future uses of force.
"[I]f it is accepted that a state or group of states can unilaterally
decide to intervene . . . [t]he door will have been opened to all
sorts of subjective claims as to when interventions are justified
and when they are not." 8 4 The position of the United States also
appeared to reject the legality of humanitarian intervention, al-
though the United States had been one of the main proponents
of the NATO-led intervention.85 Other criticisms of the NATO
intervention and its humanitarian justification included ques-
tions about why NATO countries were so keen on intervening in
the former Yugoslavia while they appeared unwilling to act in
other equally troubled regions,86 as well as proposals to reform
the Security Council by eliminating the veto structure and by
replacing it with a voting majority.87
While many in the international community would agree
that the status of humanitarian intervention within international
law remains vague, most would admit that states have continu-
82. See Paul Rogers, Lessons to Learn, 55 WORLD TODAY 4, 4-6 (Sept. 1999).
This was a statement issued by the British Secretary of Defense.
83. Marc Weller, Armed Samaritans, COUNSEL 20-22 (Aug. 1999).
84. Michael Byers, Kosovo: An Illegal Operation, COUNSEL 16-18 (Aug. 1999).
85. Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo,
94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 301, 301 (2000). Acting Senior Legal Adviser to the United
States State Department, Michael Matheson, stated that "many NATO states - in-
cluding the United States - had not accepted the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion as an independent legal basis for military action that was not justified by self-
defense or the authorization of the Security Council." Id.
86. See James Mayall, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, in
KoSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 38,
§ 20; Simon Duke et al., The Major European Allies: France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,
supra note 38, § 9.
87. Catherine Guicherd, International Law and the War in Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL
19, 25 (Summer 1999).
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ously debated the concept of humanitarian intervention and
have, at times, accepted its legitimacy. The two sections below
will discuss two concepts related to humanitarian intervention:
responsibility to protect and involuntary sovereignty waiver.
Both of these theories provide evidence that the international
community has become increasingly comfortable with breaking
the sovereignty shield and has continued to discuss the possibil-
ity of intervention against rogue regimes. As it will be explored
in Part VI below, such sovereignty breaking can, under this type
of rationale, be justified in instances where the rogue regime is
provoking a refugee crisis of a severe magnitude.
B. Responsibility to Protect
The phrase "responsibility to protect" was initially used in
the 2001 report of the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS); this commission had been
formed in response to then-United Nations' Secretary General
Kofi Annan's question of when the international community
must intervene in order to stop humanitarian suffering.88 ICISS
was specifically tasked with determining when the principle of
state sovereignty should yield to the principle of humanitarian
intervention - action aimed at preventing a humanitarian crisis
within the borders of a sovereign state. The ICISS Report noted
that the traditional notion of state sovereignty has evolved to-
ward "sovereignty as responsibility in both international func-
tions and external duties."89
Two devastating events slowed the progress of the concept
of responsibility to protect: the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks on the World Trade Center and the March 2003 United
States' invasion of Iraq.90 In light of these two events, many
states focused on preventing further terrorist attacks, and many
states feared that any interventionist doctrine, like responsibility
to protect, would be mis-used in the future to justify another
88. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT 12-13 (Dec. 2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report]; see also Max W. Mathews, Note,
Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: the Responsibility to Protect
and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 138 (2008).
89. ICISS Report, supra note 88, § 2.14.
90. See An Introduction to the Responsibility to Protect § 1, INT'L COALITION FOR
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEcr, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/
about-rtop/learn-about-rtop [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COALITION].
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Iraq-like invasion. Despite such setbacks, Kofi Annan contin-
ued to promote the development of responsibility to protect."1
In addition, African Union member states embraced this con-
cept by including it in the Constitutive Act of this organization's
Charter.9 2 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union states that it is the "right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect
of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity."9 3 Article 4(h) thus reflects the African
Union member states' acceptance of responsibility to protect,
as it authorizes member states to intervene in each other's af-
fairs in order to prevent humanitarian catastrophes from
occurring.
The development of responsibility to protect resulted in in
the creation of the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005;
this document was accepted by most heads of state present at
that year's World Summit.94 Paragraphs 135-138 of the World
Outcome Document stipulate that each individual state has the
primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and
that the international community should assist and encourage
states to exercise this responsibility. Moreover, these
paragraphs provide that the international community has the re-
sponsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and
other peaceful means to help protect populations threatened by
these crimes.'5 Finally, according to these paragraphs, when a
state manifestly fails in its protection responsibilities, and peace-
ful means are inadequate, the international community should
91. Id. § 2 (noting that as part of his effort to promote responsibility to protect,
in 2003 Kofi Annan formed the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
to report on how the UN should confront the greatest security threats of the 21st
century). Moreover, the Secretary-General published his own report entitled In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. This
report was similar to the High-level Panel, in which he emphasized the need of gov-
ernments to take action against threats of massive human rights violations and other
large scale acts of violence against civilians).
92. CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION [CONSTITUTION] Jul. 11, 2000,
available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key oau/au-act.htm.
93. Id. at art. 4(h).
94. INTERNATIONAL COALITION, supra note 90, § 4.
95. Id.
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take stronger measures, including collective use of force author-
ized by the Security Council though its Chapter VII powers. 96
The concept of responsibility to protect has developed since
the 2005 World Summit in several significant ways. First, Secur-
ity Council officially referred to responsibility to protect for the
first time in unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Pro-
tection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.97 Second, another Secur-
ity Council Resolution (1706, which authorized the deployment
of United Nations peacekeeping troops in Darfur, specifically
referred to above-mentioned Resolution 1674 and to paragraphs
138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
(also on responsibility to protect).98 Third, other recent Security
Council resolutions have more indirectly referenced responsibil-
ity to protect by focusing on the protection of civilians in conflict
areas. For example, Resolution 1970 passed in 2011 called upon
Libya's "responsibility to protect" by referring the situation to
the ICC and imposing financial sanctions as well as an arms em-
bargo.99 Resolution 1973 authorized the enforcement of a no-fly
zone and the use of force for "all necessary measures . . . to
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat or at-
tack . . . while excluding a foreign occupation force of any
form[."100 This Resolution also condemned the Libyan govern-
ment for allowing gross violations of human rights and attacks
against civilians that may amount to crimes against humanity.10
Moreover, Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 on Cote
d'Ivoire in 2011, condemning human rights violations occurring
against the civilian population in this country and labeling them
a crime against humanity.1 02 Resolution 1975 specifically stated
that it was the primary responsibility of each state to protect
civilians; because of Cote d'Ivoire's failure to do so, Resolution
1975 reaffirmed the United Nations' mandate in this country, as
well as the use of force for all necessary means to protect civil-
ians.103 These two sets of resolutions represent evidence of the
international community's growing consensus that each state
96. Id.
97. G.A. Res. 1674, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
98. G.A. Res. 1706, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
99. G.A. Res. 1970, $ 4-14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
100. G.A. Res. 1973, 1 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
101. Id. at 1.
102. See generally G.A. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975 (Mar. 30, 2011).
103. Id.
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has a responsibility to protect civilians within its own borders,
but that in instances where a state fails to do so it is appropriate
and important for the Security Council to use force in order to
prevent humanitarian suffering
Despite recent developments in the evolution of the re-
sponsibility to protect theory, it would be premature to assert
that this theory has reached the status of binding law. States'
recent opposition to the concept of responsibility to protect
demonstrates the lack of consistent and uniform state practice
needed for the creation of a customary norm. For example, in
2007, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution on
the situation in Burma, arguing that the internal affairs of a sov-
ereign state such as Burma should not be debated within the
Security Council, and proposing to refer the situation to the
Human Rights Council.104 Additionally, Security Council mem-
ber states did not refer to responsibility to protect in the Darfur
Resolution, which had authorized the deployment of a hybrid
United Nations-African Union military force in this troubled re-
gion. "As compared to the earlier Resolution 1674, this limited
endorsement was disappointing to the community of civil soci-
ety and policymakers working to advance the norm."105 Moreo-
ver, states have expressed opposition to responsibility to protect
outside of the Security Council, by declining to provide funding
for the office of the new Special Adviser on responsibility to
protect.10 6 While this decision was partially caused by other pro-
cedural matters, it nonetheless reflected some United Nations'
member states' viewpoint that responsibility to protect did not
represent a truly binding norm of international law.
Most importantly, it should be noted that responsibility to
protect, even if it were to become binding law, does not modify
the existing rules on the use of force under the United Nations'
Charter system. As described above, responsibility to protect
contemplates any type of military intervention against a rogue
regime within the existing Security Council structure. Accord-
ing to responsibility to protect, states are not authorized to uni-
laterally use force against other states to force them into
compliance with international law. Instead, it is up to the Secur-
ity Council to intervene to halt humanitarian suffering. Respon-
104. INTERNATIONAL COALITION, supra note 90.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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sibility to protect does not offer a legal rationale for
humanitarian intervention, outside of the confines of the ex-
isting international law use of force regime.
Finally, it should also be noted that implementation of re-
sponsibility to protect has been slow. On January 12, 2009,
United Nations Secretary-General issued a report entitled "Im-
plementing the Responsibility to Protect." 07 The report called
for a three-pillar approach. First, Pillar One emphasizes that
states have the primary responsibility to protect their popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. 08 Second, Pillar Two "addresses the commit-
ment of the international community to provide assistance to
States in building capacity to protect their populations from ge-
nocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises
and conflicts break out."1 09 Finally, Pillar Three recognizes that
the international community has the responsibility to take ac-
tion to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in situations where a state is manifestly
failing to protect its population.110 The Secretary-General's re-
port further urged the General Assembly to develop a strategy
for implementing responsibility to protect, according to the
three pillars described in the report."' The United Nations'
General Assembly passed a resolution in 2009, whereby it ac-
cepted to continue considering the development and implemen-
tation of responsibility to protect.1 12 Since 2009, the General
Assembly member states have debated responsibility to protect
but have failed to progress further than agreeing to continue
"considering" this concept. 113 Thus, despite Secretary-General's
report and his calls for the implementation of responsibility to
107. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N.
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/imple
menting%20the%20rtop.pdf [hereinafter Implementing RtoP].
108. Id.
109. INTERNATIONAL COALITION, supra note 90 (citing Implementing RtoP).
110. Implementing RtoP, supra note 107.
111. Id.
112. The Responsibility to Protect, G.A. Res. 63/308, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/
308 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Resolution%20RtoP
(3).pdf.
113. See INTERNATIONAL COALITION, supra note 90.
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protect, states have resisted any real implementation efforts and
have limited themselves to debating this idea.
To conclude, despite slow progress in the development and
implementation of responsibility to protect, it appears that
states seem at least willing to debate the concept, demonstrating
their readiness to discuss a sovereignty-breaking theory. In this
sense, responsibility to protect is revolutionary and may provide
legal justification for instances of humanitarian intervention un-
dertaken to alleviate refugee suffering of a significant
magnitude.
C. Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver
Like responsibility to protect, the theory of involuntary sov-
ereignty waiver is another sovereignty-encroaching concept,
which purports to legitimize intervention in the internal affairs
of a rogue regime, if the latter abuses its own population. The
term "involuntary sovereignty waiver" was first coined by Rich-
ard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the State Department
in the George W. Bush Administration and the current Presi-
dent of the Council on Foreign Relations.114 Haass argued that
states "waive" their sovereignty if they commit one of the fol-
lowing sets of acts: if they harbor weapons of mass destruction;
if they sponsor or protect terrorists; and if they commit humani-
tarian abuses. 115 Haass' theory, like responsibility to protect,
embraces the notion that a state committing humanitarian viola-
tions against its own population may not be able to resist exter-
nal actors' involvement within its borders.
According to Haass, external actors may intervene in the
internal affairs of such rogue states in order to eradicate rogue
behavior. In other words, rogue states cannot claim the protec-
tion of their sovereignty shield, and can be intruded upon by
outside actors because "sovereignty is not a blank check," and
114. Haass initially developed his theory in 2002, arguing that states waive their
sovereignty if they commit atrocities against their own people or if they harbor ter-
rorists. Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, NEW YORKER (Apr. 1, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/01/the-next-world-order. Haass
amended his theory in 2003, when he added states that pursue weapons of mass de-
struction. Richard N. Haass, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the
Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University: Sovereignty: Existing
Rights, Evolving Responsibilities, WASHINGTON FILE (Jan. 14, 2003), available at http:/
/www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/01-15.htm [hereinafter Georgetown Speech].
115. Georgetown Speech, supra note 114.
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"outlaw regime" jeopardize their sovereignty "by pursuing reck-
less policies fraught with danger for their citizens and the inter-
national community."116 Haass' theory is different from
responsibility to protect, because Haass argued that such outside
intervention could be undertaken by one of the powerful states
themselves, such as the United States, without any United Na-
tions' involvement or specific approval by the Security Coun-
cil.117 According to Haass' argument, humanitarian intervention
would become another exceptions to the general ban on the use
of force, pursuant to which powerful states could engage in uni-
lateral military action against rogue regimes, in order to prevent
a humanitarian catastrophe.118
The involuntary sovereignty waiter theory has not been uni-
versally embraced, because it is unclear whether this theory was
ever meant to apply to states other than the United States and
its closest allies, and because some scholars have questioned
whether the development of this type of rationale would signal a
return to a rule by the Great Powers - our planet's most power-
ful (few) states.119 Nonetheless, the involuntary sovereignty
waiver theory evidences at least one state's willingness to debate
the existence of a humanitarian intervention-type justification
for the use of unilateral military force. This type of argument,
like the concept of responsibility to protect, represents a novel
use of force theory, and a novel understanding of the traditional
notion of state sovereignty. The development of this theory
could lead toward authorizing the use of force outside of the
confines of the United Nations Charter system.
116. MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: "SELFISTANS," SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS 51
(2012) (citing RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILI-
TARY FORCE IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD (rev'd ed. 1999)).
117. Georgetown Speech, supra note 114.
118. See Michal J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: "Involuntary Sov-
ereignty Waiver"? Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the
Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 403-404 (2005) (detailing
Haass' view).
119. Scholars have discussed Haass' theory in the context of an evolving "rule"
by the Great Powers - the most powerful states on the international stage, such as the
Security Council permanent members (United States, Russia, China, France, and
Great Britain), as well as other economically, politically, and militarily powerful states
such as Germany, Japan, and Italy. Because Haass argued that interventions could be
unilaterally staged by powerful countries, like the Great Powers, against "rogue" re-
gimes, scholars have wondered whether this constitutes a return to a Great Powers'
Rule. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 118; STERIO, supra 116.
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In light of the above, it can be argued that humanitarian
intervention is an emerging norm of international law. Moreo-
ver, humanitarian intervention, coupled with theories of respon-
sibility to protect and involuntary sovereignty waiver,
demonstrate the international community's willingness to re-
evaluate the traditional norms of state sovereignty, as well as to
create novel authorizations for external military involvement in
bloody civil wars. The catastrophic refugee situation in Iraq and
Syria, caused by ongoing violence as well as the ISIS conflict,
illustrates the necessity for the development of new humanita-
rian rationales toward the use of force outside of the Charter
system. The section below will discuss the applicability of the
humanitarian intervention exception to the refugee crisis in Iraq
and Syria.
VI. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AGAINST ISIS
To HALT REFUGEE CRISIS
Does international law, and in particular, the emerging
norm of humanitarian intervention, allow states to intervene in
an ongoing internal conflict, which has caused a refugee crisis of
humanitarian proportions, and which the internal authorities
have been unwilling or unable to contain? This Article argues
that if one accepts the existence of the humanitarian interven-
tion exception to the overall ban on the use of force, then this
exception does and should encompass severe refugee crisis. In
other words, if states are allowed to intervene in the territory of
another state under the guise of humanitarian intervention, then
such intervention can occur in instances where the refugee situa-
tion in the offending state has become intolerable and has
reached the threshold of a humanitarian catastrophe. In addi-
tion, the theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver, discussed
above, lends support for the same view - that governments
which abuse their own populations, by failing to contain and ad-
equately address a severe refugee crisis forfeit or waive the right
to be free of external interventions.120
The right of any state to intervene in the internal affairs and
within boundaries of another state should never be unlimited
and should always comport to stringent norms and carefully pre-
scribed circumstances. Harold Koh and several other scholars
120. See supra Part V.
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have recently argued, in the context of the unfolding Syrian cri-
sis, that states have the right, under international law, to engage
in a humanitarian-type intervention within the territory of a
state which is unable or unwilling to contain the humanitarian
crisis.1 2 1 The same argument is applicable to a situation where
the humanitarian crisis consists of a severe refugee crisis, if and
when such a refugee crisis rises to the magnitude of a veritable
tragedy. As Part III above has described, the refugee crisis in
Syria and Iraq, caused by the ongoing ISIS conflict, has risen to
such levels.122 In both of these countries, significant refugee cri-
ses had existed for several years prior to the current ISIS con-
flict, because of other ongoing conflicts in these areas. Iraq had
been in a state of conflict since the United States invasion in
2003, and Syria has been in the throes of a serious internal con-
flict since the Arab Spring in 2011.123 The existing and unfolding
refugee situations were only exacerbated by the ISIS offensive,
and as Part III above describes, thousands of displaced persons
in both Iraq and Syria are in dire necessity of humanitarian as-
sistance.124 Because the governments of Iraq and Syria are un-
willing or unable to adequately address the refugee crises within
their borders, external states have the right, under international
law, to intervene in a military fashion in order to alleviate the
humanitarian suffering of thousands of refugees in this troubled
geographic area.
What would such a military intervention aimed at halting a
refugee crisis entail? What limitations should international law
encompass to authorize such an intervention while curtailing it
to its true humanitarian goal? This Article argues that Harold
Koh's proposed framework for humanitarian intervention in
general should apply to a refugee crisis as well, if such a crisis
rises to the same level of a humanitarian catastrophe. Accord-
ing to Koh, humanitarian intervention could be legal under in-
ternational law if the following criteria are met:
[1] If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly disrup-
tive of international order- including proliferation of chemical weap-
ons, massive refugee outflows, and events destabilizing to regional
peace and security of the region- that would likely soon create an
121. Koh Part II, supra note 78.
122. See supra Part III.
123. See supra Part III (discussing unfolding conflict and refugee crisis in Iraq
and Syria).
124. See supra Part III.
2015] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION "EXCEPTION" 355
imminent threat to the acting nations (which would give rise to an
urgent need to act in individual and collective self-defense under Ar-
ticle 51);
[2] a Security Council resolution were not available because of per-
sistent veto; and the group of nations that had persistently sought Se-
curity Council action had exhausted all other remedies reasonably
available under the circumstances, they would not violate U.N. Char-
ter Article 2(4) if they used;
[3] limited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes that was neces-
sary and proportionate to address the imminent threat, would demon-
strably improve the humanitarian situation, and would terminate as
soon as the threat is abated. 125
The first criterion of the Koh framework already encom-
passes "massive refugee outflows" as one of the possible ways in
which international order could be disrupted sufficiently to war-
rant an external military intervention.126 In the context of the
ongoing ISIS conflict in Iraq and Syria, it is undisputed that the
refugee situation has destabilized regional peace and security.
As I have argued elsewhere, I do not agree with Professor Koh
that the humanitarian situation needs to create an imminent
threat to intervening nations and to give rise to the necessity of
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. 12 7 Instead, I believe that humanitarian intervention is
necessary precisely in those instances where other uses of force,
such as self-defense and Security Council authorization, are not
available. Thus, I believe that humanitarian intervention in gen-
eral should be authorized where a humanitarian crisis has cre-
ated a situation disruptive of international order and regional
peace and stability; if an extra-ordinary refugee situation is an
integral element of such a humanitarian crisis, such as in Iraq
and Syria during the ISIS conflict, then I believe that external
states have the right to intervene in order to halt the humanita-
rian suffering, even if the intervening nations' interests are not
threatened by the crisis. Moreover, in the context of the ISIS
conflict and the refugee situation in Iraq and Syria, it is evident
that the Security Council is not likely to act, because of persis-
tent veto and threat of veto by Russia and/or China, and that
potentially- intervening nations would have exhausted all other
125. Koh Part II, supra note 78.
126. Id.
127. Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: Legitimate and Legal?,
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reasonably available remedies.1 28 Finally, intervening nations
themselves would have the burden of tailoring their humanita-
rian intervention to a military action necessary and proportion-
ate to the ongoing stability threat, caused by the refugee crisis,
as well as to an operation which would improve the humanita-
rian suffering, by addressing the refugee situation and attempt-
ing to halt the ongoing flow of refugees. Thus, a military
intervention launched under this framework in Iraq and Syria
would attempt to combat ISIS forces in order to liberate areas
from which refugees have fled and to allow such refugees to re-
turn to their homes, or to re-settle them in other available and
suitable geographic areas. Any such intervention would be ter-
minated as soon as the refugee situation is abated, but presuma-
bly a form of peacekeeping military presence in Iraq and Syria
could continue for a longer time, to ensure that ISIS forces to
not return and recapture the same land areas.
The United States already has engaged in military action
against ISIS. Starting in September 2014, the United States has
carried out numerous air strikes against ISIS in northern Syria
and in Iraq.1 29 Other nations have similarly conducted military
operations of their own.o30 In early 2015, Jordanian fighter jets
joined the fight against ISIS by carrying out strikes in Syria
against ISIS targets.131 The international community has, short
of condoning such unilateral military interventions, indicated
that it considers ISIS to be a criminal organization whose lead-
128. Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet
Again on Syria; No Outcome, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/29/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE97S17R20130829 (noting Russia and
China had vetoed three proposed resolutions which would have condemned Assad
regime and threatened United Nations sanctions).
129. Jim Sciutto, U.S. airstrikes hit ISIS inside Syria for first time, CNN (Sept. 23,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/u-s-airstrikes-isis-syria/; Avaneesh
Pandey, Pentagon Acknowledges Airstrikes Against ISIS May Have Caused Civilian
Deaths, Initiates Investigation, INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.ibtimes
.com/pentagon-acknowledges-airstrikes-against-isis-may-have-caused-civilian-deaths-
1775602 (reporting, inter alia, "U.S.-led coalition has carried out nearly 1,400 air-
strikes on ISIS strongholds in Iraq and Syria since the aerial offensive began last
August. . .").
130. Helene Cooper & Anne Barnard, Jordan and Emirates Carry Out Airstrikes
in Syria Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes
.com/201 5/02/11/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-resume-airstrikes-against-isis
.html?-r=0 (reporting both Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have carried out air
strikes against ISIS in Syria).
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ers should face international criminal responsibility.1 3 2 In No-
vember 2014, the United Nations' Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluded that ISIS has com-
mitted war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that leaders
of the militant group should be held accountable by organiza-
tions such as the International Criminal Court.133 In light of all
of the above, it seems logical to argue that international law al-
lows states like the United States and Jordan to intervene in
Syria and Iraq, because the latter are unable or unwilling to con-
trol the refugee catastrophe brought about by the ISIS conflict.
Harold Koh's proposed framework, delineating the legal param-
eters of humanitarian intervention, is perfectly applicable to the
current refugee crisis in Iraq and Syria, caused by ISIS.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Because humanitarian intervention is a necessity in to-
day's world of civil strife and violent internal conflicts, its legal
framework needs to be developed and constructedFalse"1 34 If
humanitarian intervention has become a necessity in today's
world, then international law needs to evolve and adapt to em-
brace this concept. Severe refugee crises, such as those taking
place in Iraq and Syria, represent instances of tremendous hu-
manitarian suffering, and there is no reason to exclude these
types of situations from the content of the developing norm of
humanitarian intervention. The above-described legal frame-
work for humanitarian intervention, proposed by Harold Koh,
represents a welcome development in the field of international
law; moreover, Koh's proposed framework covers situations of
refugee crises.135 The international community should rely on
this type of novel legal argument to intervene in Iraq and Syria,
in order to halt the ongoing refugee catastrophe, under the para-
digm of humanitarian intervention.
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2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/opinion/make-isis-leaders-face-jus-
tice.html?_r=0 (arguing ISIS leaders should stand prosecution before International
Criminal Court).
133. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr
.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentlnternationalCommission
.aspx.
134. Sterio, supra note 127, at 169.
135. See Koh Part II, supra note 78.

